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Abstract 
     
Many in the industry see the ride-sharing company Uber as the crown jewel of information 
and communication technology (ICT) particularly of the digital service platform and sharing 
economy. Uber has been exploring the new frontier of the ICT-driven disruptive business 
model (IDBM) and succeeded in its global expansion to over 479 cities in more than 75 
countries worldwide in June of 2016. 
    Such rapid expansion provides constructive insights regarding the significance of IDBM, 
not only in transportation but also in almost all other business fields. While at the same time 
Uber’s legal battles in some cities around the world raise a serious question regarding the 
rationale of IDBM. 
    In light of such a question, this paper examined the institutional sources contrasting 
success and failure in Uber’s global expansion. 
    By the comparative empirical analysis, it was identified that the contrast could be 
attributed to a bi-polarization nature of ICT-driven logistic growth, and the success can be 
attributed to a co-evolutionary acclimatization that harnesses the vigor of counterparts. 
    This analysis suggests the significance of IDBM with a consolidated challenge to social 
demand (CCSD); it demonstrated that a co-evolutionary acclimatization played a 
transformative role in this accomplishment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Keywords: Sharing economy, Digital service platform, Uber’s global expansion, Legal 
battles, ICT-driven disruptive business model, Co-evolutionary acclimatization, Consolidated 
challenge to social demand 
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1. Introduction 
 
Uber, a high-tech ride-sharing platform company, was founded in March 2009 and is 
regarded as the highest-valued venture-supported firm. It is seen as the crown jewel of 
information and communication technology (ICT) particularly of the digital service platform 
and sharing economy as it brilliantly connects the transportation industry with ICT via its 
ride-sharing application and it leverages the sharing revolution (Belk, 2014 [3]). 
Consequently, it fully enjoys the benefits of collaborative consumption characterized by (i) 
selling use of a product rather than ownership of a product, (ii) supporting customers in their 
desire to resell goods, (iii) exploiting unused resources and capacities, (iv) providing repair 
and maintenance services, and (v) using collaborative consumption (Matzler et al., 2015, 
[14]).  
Uber is currently one of the fastest growing start-ups worldwide and has been exploring the 
new frontier of the ICT-driven disruptive business model (IDBM) (Watanabe et al., 2016 
[28]). Based on this model, it has succeeded in its global expansion to over 479 cities in more 
than 75 countries worldwide in June of 2016. Its value exceeds the value of the full US taxi 
and limousine industry. 
    Such rapid expansion provides constructive insights regarding the significance of IDBM 
not only in transportation but also in almost all other business fields, including goods, 
professional services, space, and money (Cohen et al., 2014 [6]). In China, they have 
developed a sharing economy model for transport like Didi. 
However, this rapid expansion resulted in the emergence of legal battles in some cities 
around the world (Arvind et al., 2014 [1]). Unlike licensed taxi drivers, private citizens 
providing ride-share services do not necessarily carry driver licenses, take licensing exams, 
purchase commercial insurance or even be required to honor all ride requests. For such 
reasons a German court, for example, banned Uber’s basic service throughout the nation. 
Licensed taxi drivers are saddled with greater costs; that hampers their ability to compete 
with ride sharing (Arvind et al., 2014 [1]).  
These battles raise a serious question regarding the rationale of IDBM. 
To date, some studies have examined the rationale of the foundation of IDBM. Cannon et 
al. (2015) [4] pointed out that some characteristics inherent in the design of sharing 
economies lead to negative externalities. Arvind et al. (2014) [1] claimed that ride sharing is 
growing due to the circumvention of costs and regulations that govern incumbent businesses. 
They also claimed that, ride sharing could exploit loopholes to avoid rules and taxes, when 
this occurred, the sharing economy became the skimming economy. As legal battles explode 
worldwide, it shed the light on both the potential and shortcomings of IDBM. Many people 
identified problems and challenges as tax confusion, liability, and economic dependence 
(Cheng, 2014 [5]). Mastrorillo (2016) [13] contended that Uber and its business practices are 
epitomizing the white collar crime as they took advantage of vulnerable customers, no 
licensed drivers, basic employee rights and violated numerous industry laws and standards.  
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Contrary to these negative views, Rogers (2015) [18] expressed his dissatisfaction that 
public debate surrounding Uber had so far generated more heat than light, revealing little 
about the company’s net impact on important public goods and values. Cusumano (2015) [8] 
pointed out that, while some startups had already run into legal and regulatory hurdles from 
city governments, courts, traditional unions or lobbies wanted to restrict or shut them down, 
the big question was really how traditional companies should compete with startups in the 
sharing economy. 
 
By considering both of light and shadow effects of the ride sharing business, European 
Parliament (2015) [11] has summarized both aspects of social and economic consequences of 
Uber, as compared in Table 1. 
Table 1 Social and Economic Consequences of Uber 
 
Efficiency gains Allegations against Uber’s business 
Reduction of search cost 
Better overview of quality and prices 
Provide ICT services assisting drivers 
Allow for better utilization of assets 
Unfair competition without following regulations/fare 
Could aspire to become monopolies 
Cars/drivers could be unsafe/underinsured 
Invade customers’ privacy 
Discrimination by drivers/passengers 
Undermine working standards/poor compensation 
Present challenges related to taxation 
 
It pointed out the challenge posed by governments including employment issues, internal 
market regulations, environment, taxation, and consumer protection. 
 
Rudmin (2016) [19], from consumer science perspective, pointed out that distributed 
inventory accessed by digitally mediated sharing as with Uber, should be examined as an 
alternative inventory behavior. 
 
While these works have shed light on the broad transformative problems of IDBM, 
inherent to newly emerging businesses, little attention has been paid to the inherent 
characteristics of  ICT, on which IDBM is based and its subsequent solutions thereon. 
 
    Authors identified that Uber’s disruptive business model can be attributed to a 
transformative shift in business design by constructing an ICT-driven platform ecosystem 
(Watanabe et al., 2016 [28]). Cusumano (2015) [8] pointed out that the sharing-economy 
startups threaten established companies to the extent that peer-to-peer networks could grow 
exponentially through the power of platform dynamics and network effects (Cusumano, 2015 
[8]).  
Oreg et al. (2015) [16] in their “Resistance to Innovation” warned that “People do not always 
choose the latest innovations. Many people find it more productive to keep using an old, 
familiar technology than rapidly adapt to a new technology.” Becker (2008) [2] suggested a 
possible function of organizational routines as a part of the family of concepts such as 
institutions, norms or conventions that can be the source of both stability and change. Davis 
(2009) [9] identified that the highly dynamic environments require flexibility to cope with a 
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flow of opportunities that typically is faster, more complex, more ambiguous, and less 
predictable than in less dynamic environments. Mella (2014) [15] postulated that the dynamic 
interconnections among systems of organizational routines could be the sources of 
endogenous organizational innovation. 
   These analyses provide a reasonable explanatory base in understanding the contrasting 
features of Uber’s global expansion, with and without legal battles. The exponential growth 
of Uber supported by the dramatic advancement of ICT might be non-adaptive to the 
institutions without flexibility and insufficient time for routinization while it could be 
adaptive to institutions with flexible and sufficient time for routinization. Also, this contrast 
could be changeable depending on the dynamic interconnections among systems of 
organizational routines.      
  Given a bi-polarization nature of ICT-driven logistic growth (Watanabe et al., 2015 [25]) on 
which Uber depends on in its global expansion (Watanabe et al., 2016 [28]), this postulate 
prompts a hypothetical view that the foregoing contrast can be attributed to a bi-polarization 
nature of ICT-driven logistic growth and that success can be attributed to a co-evolutionary 
acclimatization that harnesses the vigor of counterparts. Furthermore, attainability of this 
target can be subject to the optimal velocity of expansion on the donor side and institutional 
elasticity of the host side. 
 
This paper focused on the inherent characteristics of ICT on which IDBM is based. Using a 
comparative empirical analysis, this hypothetical view was demonstrated. A possible solution 
based on a concept of a co-evolutionary acclimatization satisfying the above conditions in 
both donor and host sides were also demonstrated. 
Section 2 reviews ICT’s indigenous functions that are driving ICT-driven disruptive business 
models (IDBM). Section 3 reveals pitfalls of the ICT advancement resulting in the emergence 
of conflicts in Uber’s global expansion. Section 4 extracts lessons from Uber’s global 
expansion success model. Section 5 briefly summarizes noteworthy findings, implications, 
and suggestions for future works.  
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2. Uber as the Jewel of ICT 
  (1) Two-faced Nature of ICT and Subsequent Un-captured GDP Emergence 
 
Uber’s global expansion can be attributed to its glory as the crown jewel of ICT. Authors 
demonstrated that current ICT-driven global development depended on a trend shifting from 
traditional co-evolution of computer-initiated ICT, captured GDP, and economic 
functionality to new co-evolution of the Internet, un-captured GDP1, and supra-functionality 
beyond economic value as illustrated in Fig. 1-1 (Watanabe et al., 2016 [27]). Authors insisted 
that Uber’s system success can be explained by this shifting co-evolutionary trend (Watanabe et 
al., 2016 [28]). They demonstrated that un-captured GDP was a key factor identifying the state 
of these shifting trends, and that two-faced nature of ICT was behind the emergence of un-
captured GDP. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1
 Un-captured GDP can be defined as added values providing utility (satisfaction of consumption) and happiness 
beyond economic value to people but cannot be measured by traditional GDP accounts (captured GDP) that 
measure economic value. Supra-functionality beyond economic value can be the typical example. 
 
Fig. 1-1. Scheme of Spin-off Dynamism.   
Fig. 1-3. Spiral Development of Uber. 
  Fig. 1-2. Spiral Development of ICT. 
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Fig. 1. Shifting Trends in the Co-evolution of the 3 Mega-trends Leveraging Spiral 
Development of ICT and Uber.  
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(2) Spin-off from Traditional Co-evolution to Un-captured GDP Oriented  
      New Co-evolution 
 
Uber’s rapid expansion worldwide along with emerging legal battles in some cities recalls 
the rapid spin-off from a traditional captured GDP based cycle to an un-captured GDP based 
new cycle which accomplishes a spiral development similar to that of ICT from computer to 
IoT over the last four decades as demonstrated in Figs. 1-2 and 1-3 . Authors demonstrated 
that Uber’s conspicuous spin-off can be attributed to its ICT inherent self-propagating 
function incorporating new functionality development during its diffusion process (Watanabe 
et al., 2016 [28]). 
 
(3) ICT-driven Disruptive Business Model 
Thus, the dynamism of Uber’s ICT-driven disruptive business model (IDBM) which can be the 
locomotive of its rapid global expansion resulting in a contrasting development between successful 
co-evolution with host institutions and legal battles are identified as illustrated in Fig. 2 (Watanabe et 
al., 2016 [28]). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. The Dynamism of ICT-driven Disruptive Business Model (IDBM). 
   Uber’s co-existing development trajectory with taxis corresponds to the two-faced nature of 
ICT that is behind the emergence of un-captured GDP as mentioned earlier. This emergence 
can be attributed to a strong substitution from taxi to Uber accelerated by contrasting vicious 
cycle between price increases and trip decreases in taxis and a virtuous cycle between price 
decline and trip increases in Uber. 
   Uber’s virtuous cycle can be attributed to ICT’s self-propagating function that enhances the 
level of functionality as its diffusion proceeds. This self-propagating function plays a vital 
role in spin-offs from traditional co-evolution to new co-evolution between ICT 
advancement, paradigm change to increasing un-captured GDP dependence, and people’s 
preference shift to supra-functionality beyond economic value. Also, this spin-off accelerates 
further lower cost and higher services, which accelerates the preceding virtuous cycle. 
   It is evident that Uber’s rapid global expansion can be attributed to constructing such ICT- 
driven disruptive business model (IDBM). Nowadays, business models have been moving 
from pipes to platforms, and we are in the midst of a transformative shift in business design. 
 Computer initiated ICT 
                                Taxi 
Internet 
    Uber 
Demand 
 
*Driven by the discrepancy between taxi 
prices and magnitude of their decline 
effect derived from Uber.  
 
The substance incorporates: 
High-qualified services with lower cost 
and shoter time. An increasing initiative 
of passengers and the company’s 
systematic market strategy of continuous 
deduction of costs and time in seasrch 
and matching, eliminating information 
asymmetries and compiling a massive 
database. 
 
* 
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Platforms allow participants to co-create and exchange value with each other. External 
developers can extend platform functionality and contribute back to the infrastructure of the 
business. Platform users who act as producers can create value on the platform for other users 
to consume. Uber’s development corresponded to this historical stream. Uber’s disruptive 
business model can be thus appreciated as a leader of a transformative shift in business 
design by constructing the preceding platform ecosystem. 
At the same time, we should not overlook the phenomena that sharing-economy startups 
threaten established companies to the extent that peer-to-peer networks can grow 
exponentially through the power of platform dynamics and network effects (Cusumano, 2015 
[8]). 
 
(4) ICT’s Indigenous Functions Driving ICT-driven Disruptive Business Model 
The preceding two-sided nature of exponential growth typical of ICT inherent logistic 
growth reminds us to review the following ICT’s indigenous functions: 
1) Two-faced Nature 
While the advancement of ICT contributes to enhancing its prices by increasing new 
functionality development, dramatic advancement of the Internet tends to decrease 
ICT prices due to freebies, easy copying, and mass standardization, among other 
things as reviewed earlier and exists behind the emergence of un-captured GDP. 
2) Self-propagating Nature 
Given ICT’s exponential growth as demonstrated by logistic growth and the 
correlation of the interaction between its advancement and institutions displays a 
systematic change in the process of its growth and maturity, its advancement leads to 
the creation of a new carrying capacity in the process of its diffusion. Thus, the level 
of carrying capacity of ICT’s logistic growth enhances as its diffusion proceeds 
leading to create logistic growth within a dynamic carrying capacity (LGDCC) as 
explained by Watanabe et al., 2004 [24] (see Appendix 1). 
As the LGDCC carrying capacity increases together with the increase of ICT as time goes 
by which demonstrates functionality spiraling increases in the context of self-propagating 
behavior. This spiral increase leverages spin-off as reviewed earlier. 
Uber’s systems success leading its rapid global expansion can be attributed to these ICT’s 
indigenous functions. 
 
Table 2 demonstrates this fact by comparing development trajectories between taxis and 
Uber in NYC2. Looking at Table 2 we note that while the development of taxis depended on 
simple logistic growth (SLG) without self-propagating functionality development as the level 
of its carrying capacity was constant through its development process, Uber’s development 
depended on LGDCC thereby it enjoyed self-propagating functionality development. 
                                                          
2
  See Fig. 12 in Watanabe et al., 2016 [28] trends in taxi and Uber’s development by their trips. 
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Table 2 Adaptability of Taxi and Uber’s Development Trajectories to LGDCC (NYC) 
LGDCC: Logistic growth with dynamic carrying capacity3,      
    Nk a b ak bk adj. R2 
  
Taxi 
  
       
(Jan. 2004 – Jun.2013)  2247.12 (6.42) 
0.017 
(12.61) 
6.364 
(6.63) 
0.439 
(0.00x) 
10.30 
(0.00x) 0.976 
Uber 
  
(Jun.2013 – Sep.2015) 119.27 
(41.41) 
0.121 
(36.67) 
49.650 
(11.13) 
0.016 
(2.42*3) 
0.200 
(1.43*5) 0.999 
 
Y: trips; Nk: carrying capacity; t: time; a, b, ak, bk: coefficients. 
Taxi: based on medallion prices, Uber: based on trips with spline interpolation (see Watanabe et al., 2016 [28]). 
SPSS  software was used for this nonlinear regression analysis (Watanabe et al., 2016 [28]). 
Figures in parenthesis indicate t-statistics: all significant at the 1% level except *3: 5 %, *5: 12 %, x: non-
significant. 
  
                                                          
3
 Third term of the denomination indicates magnitude of dynamic carrying capacity formation, without which Y 
is simple logistic growth (SLG). a: belocty of diffusion, and b: initial stage of diffusion. ak and bk play similar 
function in dynamic carrying capacity formation. 
ta
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3. Pitfall of ICT Advancement 
3.1 Uber’s Expansion and Battles 
(1) Rapid Expansion  
Supported by ICT’s indigenous self-propagating functionality development dynamism 
Uber expanded rapidly leading to offering its services in over 479 cities in more than 75 
countries worldwide by June of 2016 as illustrated in Fig. 3. 
 
Fig. 3. Uber’s Expansion in 479 Cities in the World (as of June 2016).  
Source: Uber. 
(2) Emergence of Legal Battles 
Proportional to such rapid expansion, legal battles emerged in some cities around the 
world. Typical cases of such contrast include: 
Thailand has completely banned it as illegal. Germany banned certain services, same as 
France, Italy, Belgium, Netherland, Finland and Brazil. Contrary to these negative cases, in 
addition to Uber’s initial foundation in the USA, Uber operates in Singapore, Saudi Arabia, 
London, Tokyo, Taiwan, Canada and Russia notwithstanding legal issues as illustrated in Fig. 
4. 
 
 
 
Fig. 4. Contrasting Features of Uber’s Global Expansion in 16 Countries (as of June 2016). 
Sources: Authors classification based on, NY Times, HuffPo, Reuters, WSI, CNN and local news reports. 
Operating notwithstanding legality Ban/Partial ban 
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3.2 Bi-polarization Fatality of Logistic Growth 
    The preceding contrast of the crown jewel of ICT reminds us of another ICT’s indigenous 
function, the bi-polarization nature of logistic growth that demonstrates ICT-driven 
development can be split into a virtuous cycle and a vicious cycle. 
 (1) Bi-polarization Fatality 
Logistic growth trajectory (upper left figures in Fig. 5) can be developed to a bi-
polarization trajectory as demonstrated in the lower left figures in Fig. 5 (Tokumasu and 
Watanabe, 2009 [20]) (see the details of mathematical development Appendix 2). 
The figure in the lower left in Fig. 5 illustrates the bi-polarization trajectory of a logistic 
growth function. The figure indicates that in the normal logistic growth as a function of time t, 
marginal increase (dY/dt) increases as time goes by as generally anticipated within the time 
shorter than a certain threshold. However, it changes to reverse upon exceeding this threshold 
resulting in marginal increase decline against anticipation.  
By the preceding review, the figure in the upper right demonstrates ICT-driven logistic 
growth in 100 countries in 2011 (Watanabe et al., 2014 [25]). Given that ICT advances 
proportional to time t, ICT-driven economic growth in 100 countries can be depicted by a 
logistic growth function consisting of ICT advancement (T) and GDP per capita (V/P) as 
demonstrating in the upper right in Fig. 5 (see 100 countries display Appendix 3). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 5. Scheme of the Bi-polarization Fatality of Logistic Growth. 
Y 
t 
N 
ateb
NY
−
⋅+
=
1
Logistic growth 
 
 
 
(Virtuous cycle) 
(Vicious cycle) 
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Since this ICT–GDP per capita logistic growth demonstrates statistical significance (see 
Appendix 3), this trajectory leads to a bi-polarization between ICT advanced 30 countries and 
ICT growing 70 countries as illustrated in the lower left in Fig. 5. While the latter 70 
countries enjoy ICT’s marginal productivity increase as ICT advances, ICT advanced 30 
countries suffer a vicious cycle between ICT advancement and its marginal productivity 
decline resulting in the great stagnation (Cowen, 2011 [7]). This can be attributed to trapping 
in ICT advancement derived from the two-faced nature of ICT reviewed earlier (Watanabe et 
al., 2015 [26]).  
(2) Co-evolutionary Acclimatization 
By the preceding reviews, Fig. 6 illustrates a whole perspective of a bi-polarization of ICT 
advancement as a consequence of a trap in ICT advancement derived from its two-faced 
nature.  
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Fig. 6. Co-evolutionary Acclimatization against Bi-polarization (A case of 100 Countries in 2011). 
 
A vicious cycle in ICT advanced economies can be attributed to a trap in ICT advancement 
(top in Fig. 6) derived from the two-faced nature of ICT, that is, while advancement of ICT, 
centered by the dramatic advancement of the Internet, generally contributes to enhanced 
prices of technology from new functionality development, the dramatic advancement of the 
Internet reacts to decreases in prices of technology due to its nature of freebies, easy copying, 
and mass standardization. Given that the firms seek to maximize profit in the competitive 
market, the marginal productivity of technology corresponds to the relative price of 
technology which, contrary to new services created by the advancement of the Internet,  
results in a decrease in ICT’s contribution to growth. This can be considered the dynamism in 
emerging un-captured GDP that the Internet provides utility and happiness to people but 
cannot be captured through GDP data (Watanabe et al., 2015 [25]).  
 
On the contrary, while ICT growing economies expect their growth increase through the 
marginal productivity of ICT increase as ICT increases, these economies cannot afford the 
required additional ICT investment  by themselves. While ICT advanced economies enable 
further advancement of ICT, it results in declining its marginal productivity which canbe 
considered as compensation for un-captured GDP emergence. Thus, such advancement 
should be shared for the advancement of ICT growing economies which enjoy a virtuous 
cycle between its advancement and marginal productivity increase leading to sustainable 
growth as illustrated in the bottom in Fig. 6. By harnessing the vigor of ICT growing 
economies through their sustainable growth, ICT advanced economies can maintain their 
growth through the marginal productivity of technology increase without falling into a trap in 
ICT advancement as illustrated in the bottom of Fig. 6 (see details of this mechanism 
Appendix 4). This maintained growth enables ICT increase which can be shared with ICT 
growing economies for their sustainable growth as reviewed earlier.  
 
These reviews suggest the co-evolutionary acclimatization system that harnesses the vigor 
of counterparts as illustrated in the bottom of Fig. 6 enables both ICT advanced, and growing 
economies to maintain sustainable growth. This system can be possible countermeasures to 
the trap in ICT advancement (Watanabe, 2013 [23]). 
 
Cannon et al. (2015) [4] suggested that “collaborative co-regulation: designing a co-
regulatory scheme that can effectively complement the inherent attributes of the sharing 
economies being regulated to improve effectiveness, the optimal level of protection of public 
interests over interest groups, and cost-effective feasibility is essential.” This suggestion 
corresponds to the concept of the co-evolutionary acclimatization. 
 
Given that Uber’s system success depends on the development of ICT, its considerable 
legal battles proportional to its rapid expansion can be attributed to this bi-polarization 
feature. Similar to excessive ICT advancement results in a vicious cycle between ICT 
advancement and productivity decline, rapid Uber expansion results in a vicious cycle. 
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3.3 Optimal Growth Rate for Self-propagation 
   Given the understanding that the adaptability of ICT advancement can be subject to 
sufficient time for routinization and that the functionality of ICT can be developed through 
the interaction with institutions in a self-propagating manner, it can be postulated that optimal 
velocity of growth would be crucial to its self-propagating functionality development. 
 
    With the understanding that this self-propagating functionality development can be 
attributed to its adaptability to logistic growth within a dynamic carrying capacity (LGDCC) 
function, Uber’s fit ability to this function subject to growth rates was compared (Fig. 7). 
 
    Table 3 demonstrates that while self-propagation can be expected in steady growth by 
fitting to LGDCC, it cannot be expected to have rapid growth. This supports the hypothetical 
view that sufficient time for routinization is required for Uber’s expansion. 
 
Koopman et al. (2014) [12] pointed out that new ventures should consider to what degree 
is the sharing economy creating new markets, rather than simply supplanting older forms of 
transactions.  
 
 
 
Fig. 7. Comparison of Uber Trips Estimate in NYC (Jun. 2013 – Sep. 2015).  
 
 
Table 3 Comparison of Adaptability of Uber’s Development Trajectories to LGDCC  
(NYC, Jun. 2013 - Sep. 2015) 
 
See Table 2 equation and notations. 
 
Figures in parenthesis indicate t-statistics: all significant at the 1% level except *3: 5%, *5: 15%, *6: 20%, x: non-significant.    
Rapid growth 11% p.a (2015/3 – 2015/9) 
Steady growth   9% p.a 
Rapid growth        Non self-propagation 
 
 
Steady growth         Self-propagation 
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3.4 Institutional Elasticity in Accepting Uber 
It is postulated that institutional elasticity of the host is required for smooth acceptance of 
Uber in its global expansion. 
 
    As pointed by European Parliament (2015) [11], such institutional issues as employment 
issues, internal regulations, environment, taxation, and consumer protection are crucial for 
smooth acceptance of Uber. Analyzing critical points impeding Uber’s smooth acceptance 
into cities with legal battles (see 3.5), internal regulations relevant to protecting the vested 
interests of incumbent organizations shared a central dimension. This dimension can be 
vividly represented by the flexibility of wage determination of the host countries/cities. 
 
Warner (2002) [22] in his international survey on wage determination in 19 countries 
identified that flexibility of wage setting demonstrates negative correlation with dependency 
on union and collective bargaining agreements (CBA). Secondly, the 19 countries split into 
two clusters, “flexible setting group” including USA, UK, Canada and Japan, and “less 
flexible setting group” including western and southern European countries and Nordic 
countries as demonstrated in Fig. 8. Finland is a country with the lowest flexibility of wage 
setting and with the highest dependency on union and CBA. This result corresponds to the 
similar survey on Finland (Tyrväinen, 1995 [21]). 
 
 
 
Fig. 8. Correlation between Centralization of Wage Setting and Union and CBA Density 
in 19 Countries in the Late 1990s. 
 
CBA: Collective bargaining agreements. Union and CBA density = (Union density + CBA coverage)/2 
Source: Warner (2002) [22] 
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    On the basis of the findings of these surveys, utilizing the ranking of flexibility of wage 
determination in 140 countries published annually by the World Economic Forum (WEF, 
2015 [29]). Table 4 demonstrates a correlation between institutional elasticity and Uber 
acceptance in 16 countries by grouping the countries by those with a positive reaction to Uber 
and those with certain legal battles with Uber. 
 
Table 4 Contrast of Institutional Elasticity in Accepting Uber in 16 Countries 
Reaction 
  to Uber 
Ranking of 
flexibility of 
wage 
determination 
           
Country 
 
State 
 
 
Generally 
positive 
 6 Singapore Legality is  pending but operating actively 
 7 Japan Seems illegal but operating 
14 Taiwan Seems illegal but operating 
15 UK Legality is pending but operating with expectation 
19 USA Generally positive 
20 Saudi Arabia Legality is pending but operating actively 
27 Russia No ban, but difficult to operate 
33 Canada Changing to support 
  
 
 
 
 
With 
certain 
legal 
battles 
69 France Partial ban as illegal 
111 Thailand Full ban 
123 Brazil Against law and prohibited except certain cities 
129 Belgium Partial ban as illegal 
131 Netherland Partial ban as illegal 
132 Germany Partial ban as illegal 
134 Italy Partial ban as illegal 
140 Finland Suspicious it is illegal but connive to operate 
 
Ranking out of 140 countries of the score of the weighted average to the state how are wages 
set [1 = by centralized bargaining processes; 7 = by each company]. 
 
Source: The Global Competitiveness Report 2015-2016 (World Economic Forum, 2015 
[29]). 
 
 
 
M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
 
AC
CE
PT
ED
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
17 
 
3.5 State of Conflict in Uber Expansion   
Aiming at identifying factors contrasting Uber’s global expansion, based on Table 4, states 
of conflict in Uber expansion in selected 16 countries were surveyed4. 
3.5.1 Generally Positive 
 
(1) Singapore [Legality is pending but operating actively] 
 
1. Taxi drivers and passengers in Singapore are welcoming taxi app services. 
2. This has led to a highly competitive taxi app market in Singapore, and existing taxi 
companies as Comfort Delgro and Trans-Cab endeavored to improve their services by 
introducing their mobile app services. 
3. COE (Certificate of Entitlement) scheme based on the tripartism framework (consists of 
Ministry of Manpower, National Trades Union Congress, and Singapore National Employers 
Federation) plays a decisive role in Singaporean’s efficient utilization of ride-sharing. 
4. Requirements and complaints can be solved through dialogues with the regulators, 
employers and employees (drivers) under the tripartism framework. 
5. Uber induced incorporating users (passengers) requirements into the tripartism 
framework by stimulating better services, thereby consolidation of all stakeholders: 
company, employee, user and government was constructed. 
6. Government agile reaction to complaints from the incumbent through open dialogue with 
all stakeholders and by acknowledging new streams of innovation versus resisting played 
a key role. 
7. The government is secretly* welcoming the taxi app services because:  
(i) Young people enjoy using services like Uber, and the government must not 
resist innovation,  
(ii) They provide job opportunities to Singapore citizens (toward aging society) 
and increase the overall productivity,  
(iii) The ride-sharing can be an approach to tackle problems of traffic clog and 
achieve efficient road usage.  
* Transport Minister urged that “we must always be fair to players, whether incumbent or insurgents and strike a 
balanced approach. 
8.  In April 2016, the government declared to allow Uber to pick up passengers, legally with 
vocational licenses (by 10 hours training program, shorter than 60 hours for taxi drivers). 
  
                                                          
4
 States are as of June 2016 based on, NY Times, HuffPo, Reuters, WSI, CNN and local news reports. Note that 
these states are subject to imminent change. 
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(2) Tokyo [Seems illegal but operating] 
1. Uber has had tremendous difficulties in making inroads into the Japanese market due to 
“Byzantine” and complicated regulations. 
2. Uber was ordered to suspend its pilot project in Fukuoka city in Feb. 2015 because it 
violates the laws. Uber stopped the project in Mar. 2015 
3. Tokyo has a rather tranquil market so far due to its qualified service seeking competitive 
market with 50,000 taxies (20% of the total in Japan and four times the number in NYC). 
Nov.2013   Uber started in Tokyo (limited launch. Expanded to whole Tokyo area from   
                   Aug. 2014). 
Jan. 2014   Tokyo Hire-Taxi Association also introduced a mobile app service. 
Jan. 2015   Japan’s largest taxi company, Nihon Kotsu launched a mobile app Line Taxi.   
Mar. 2015  Japanese government stated Uber probably violates laws (unlicensed, safety).                      
  Uber reacted by continuing  talks. 
Mar. 2015  Japan’s e-commerce giant Rakuten entered the ride-sharing industry by  
  purchasing 11.9% in Lyft. 
Oct. 2015  Prime Minister Abe instructed relaxing regulation for ride-share in isolated 
areas. 
4. Although the legal framework in Japan does not allow private cars or ordinary persons to 
operate as a paid taxi, taxi companies in Tokyo recognized Uber as a business competitor 
and worked towards improving their services by developing new functions. 
5. With government and broader industries involvement for social demand (traffic, aging, 
isolated rural) co-evolution emerged between IDBM (existing taxi companies also 
improved their services by introducing their mobile app services) and advancement of 
institutional systems by solving social demand. 
(3) Taiwan [Seems illegal but operating] 
1. In response to Taipei’s taxi drivers’ protests against Uber over the summer of 2014, 
Taiwanese government planned to pull the app from local stores as it does not meet the 
country’s legislation. 
2. In December 2014, Uber Taiwan was punished with fines and a cease and desists of the 
app for operating illegally. 
3. Issues included failure to insure vehicles, operating as a business without a business 
license, metered fares unknown to passengers, metered fares not inspected by the 
Ministry of Transportation and Communication, and failure to report income and pay 
taxes. Many drivers had their licenses suspended for violations.  
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4. In December 2014 the Ministry of Transportation and Communications announced that 
the company was operating unlicensed taxis in violation of national law and that the 
government was considering blocking the service. 
5. In March 2016 the officials of Ministry of Transportation and Communications said 
there are about 3,000 private car owners are working for ride-sharing service, even 
though the service remains illegal in the country. The cabinet announced that Uber is not 
welcome in Taiwan since it has never paid local taxes and all of its transactions are 
processed overseas. 
6. Also in March 2016, The Ministry of Transportation and Communications announced 
heavier fines. The fine for the first time offender driving a private car seating nine or 
fewer passengers or a truck weighing 35,00 kilogram or less is NT$50,000 (US$1,534), 
and the vehicle’s license plate will be suspended for two months. The fines for the 
second to the fourth offense have been raised to NT$ 60,000, NT$ 70,000, NT$ 80,000 
respectively and license plate suspension for three, four and six months respectively. 
Fine for fifth or subsequent violations was set to NT$ 100,000 and license plates 
revoked.  
7. In June 2016 the Transportation officials decided to step up the police crackdown on 
Uber drivers in the country’s six municipalities. The Fair Trade Commission fined NT$ 
1 million to Uber for the false statements on the company’s website that may mislead 
private drivers into thinking that driving for Uber is lawful. 
8. In response, Uber is determined to support their passengers and drivers by considering 
them an integral part of its business. Uber has been continuously paying the fines of its 
drivers. Since September 2014 Uber has been fined more than NT$ 56 million (US$1.7 
million) for violating the Highway Act. 
9. Uber is hoping to communicate with Taiwan’s new government to effectively manage 
and include the sharing economy platform industry in legal frameworks and use 
innovation and big data technology to improve the quality of transportation.  
(4) London [Legality is pending but operating with expectation] 
 
1. Black taxis have been the kings of the British capital's roads for over a century, but now 
they are battling a high-technology rival that threatens their dominance. Uber is active in 
three cities (London, Manchester, and Leeds) in the UK. 
2. Uber has won a significant legal victory in the UK, with London's high court ruling that 
Uber’s app does not constitute a taximeter. 
3. The legal challenge was brought by London's transport agency Transport for London 
(TfL), following pressure from the city's black cab and taxi drivers. 
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4. While taximeters devices which record distance travelled and are used to calculate fares 
are only allowed for licensed taxis, the judge ruled that the legal definition of a taximeter 
doesn't include "smart phones which rely on data from a server outside the vehicle." 
5. Uber hailed the decision as a "victory for common sense," adding that the ruling means 
the company won't have to change how its app works in London. 
6. London Mayor reported that “The technological innovation should not ban, unnecessarily, 
that which will serve a good purpose to the Londoners.” This showed the positive impact 
of the service in the country. He also added that some solution needs to be sorted out so 
that the growth of Uber services does not impact the traditional black taxi drivers. 
7. London's Licensed Taxi Drivers Association described the outcome as unbelievable. The 
transport authority has also asked the court to determine if the service is, in fact, legal. 
8. Notwithstanding the above victory, Uber still faces ongoing legal challenges in London, 
including proposals to introduce compulsory five-minute wait times and the removal of 
car icons from the map in the Uber app. 
(5) USA [Generally positive] 
 
1. Uber has first laid its foundation in the US with great success. Later regulatory acts were 
brought against it by the local taxi drivers. It had taken the sharing economy to a next 
level. A very strong installation growth occurred in the USA with a rate of 1.4% slowly 
developing to be a strong economy with 20% by the end of the second quarter of its 
introduction.  
2. Its main popularity is based on its demand side which has its base on the supply. The 
introduction of ride sharing system by Uber gave a new aspect for more people opting in 
as the prices were efficient in comparison to the taxi drivers. By the end of 2015, 55% of 
the ground transportation receipts were for Uber while 43% were for the taxi services.  
3. Uber is operating in 75% of US locations although banned in Nevada and Oregon, and 
there were multiple on-going lawsuits. Among US cities, San Francisco tops the position 
with 79% usage, while Dallas is 60% and followed by Los Angeles with 54%. 
4. While many cities in the US readily accepted this disruptive innovation, cities like New 
York, Texas, Portland, Birmingham, etc. stood against Uber because it had no 
regulations. Regulatory systems were made to be enforced. State legislators in Ohio and 
Florida are moving ahead with regulations governing Uber and other ride services that 
would designate all drivers as independent contractors, bolstering a critical but much-
disputed aspect of Uber's business model. 
5. The battle between Portland and Uber led to a 120-day pilot program, where Uber was 
allowed to operate legally in the city if and only if it followed the guidelines such as 
verifying that the drivers were under the TNC (Transportation Network Companies) or 
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TLC (Taxi and Limousine Commission), insurance card and certificate. These regulations 
ensured safety for the riders if they opt for ridesharing.  
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(6) Saudi Arabia [Legality is pending but operating actively] 
1. Saudi Arabia's discriminatory automotive policies against women have allowed Uber to 
achieve great success, due to females having limited options for transportation. 
2. Women are not allowed to drive as it is feared to damage their ovaries leading to children 
born with clinical problems. 
3. Since women cannot keep their jobs in Saudi Arabia because they have trouble finding 
reliable transportation to get to work, Uber triggered an institutional revolution for 
women’s social participation as demonstrated by the fact that women make up 70% of 
Uber's customers. 
4. With such expectation, Uber operates in the Islamic holy cities of Mecca and Medina, as 
well as the capital city of Riyadh, and the port cities of Jeddah and Dammam. The service 
is expected to be available in several more cities shortly. 
5. While there remains the issue of compliance with traditional government regulations, 
negotiations with the institutional regulators in Saudi Arabia have been extremely positive 
compared to other countries reception towards the app business. 
6. Thus, Uber is expected to grow 50-60 % in trips per months in Saudi Arabia in 2016, 
which in turn accelerates social innovation in the country leading to a co-evolution 
between ICT-driven disruptive innovation and change in institutional systems triggered by 
women’s social participation. 
7. In June 2016, the Saudi Arabia’s Public Investment Fund announced to invest US$ 3.5 
billion in Uber. The investment is a part of the Saudi Arabia’s 2030 vision to reduce the 
country’s dependence on oil, its unemployment, and workforce inequality.  
(7) Russia [No ban, but difficult to offer service] 
1. Regulations in Russia are comparatively simple in comparison to other countries. 
2. Moscow has already a culture of unlicensed taxis that makes Uber’s expansion difficult. 
3. Citizens can often hail one by standing on the street corner or via some apps that had 
existed for years before Uber arrived. 
4. Since 2011, Russia’s main search engine company, Yandex, has been running a taxi-app 
that now is simply know as Russia’s Uber. 
5. Uber also trails Gett, known as the Uber of Israel, which operates 10,000 cars in Moscow. 
6. In February 2016, the Moscow’s Transport Department threatened to ban Uber from the 
city unless it signs an agreement to use officially registered drivers and share travel data 
with local authorities. 
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7. In March Uber reached an agreement with Moscow transport officials that gave it the 
green light to continue operating in the Russian capital. 
(8) Canada [Changing to support] 
1. Uber drivers in Canada are required to register, collect and remit HST/GST from their 
fares to the government, regardless of their income. 
2. In December 2012, officials in the city of Toronto charged Uber with 25 municipal 
licensing infractions. Passengers may be fined for using Uber X, up to $ 20,000 according 
to a Toronto city councilor. 
3. Uber was made legal in the city of Edmonton by passing a by-law. However, Uber ceased 
its operations in Edmonton in March 2016 citing the inability to obtain the necessary 
insurance. The City of Calgary, Alberta has charged at least 17 drivers illegally driving for 
Uber. 
4. These drivers were operating without legally mandated insurance. Uber continues to 
operate illegally in the other regions of Canada. 
5. Toronto Mayor expressed his support for Uber in 2014, and other cities are slowly 
beginning to look at regulatory options. 
(9) EC [Encouraging in principle] 
1. On 2nd June 2016, The European Commission presented guidelines intended to support 
consumers, businesses and public authorities to engage confidently in the collaborative 
economy and to foster the development of new Internet-based sharing economy startups in 
Europe (EC, 2016 [10]). On the issue of restrictions, the report explained that the absolute 
ban or any quantitative restrictions on sharing economy services (Uber, Airbnb) should be 
proportionate to the public interest at stake, such as public safety or social policy and 
should only be used as a measure of last resort.  
 
2. The European Commission Vice-President for Jobs, Growth, Investment and 
Competitiveness, stressed the importance of keeping Europe as open as the USA for new 
innovative business models while addressing the negative effects, but such businesses 
should not become a “parallel informal economy” operating free of regulation. He further 
stressed that the government’s role should be to encourage a regulatory environment that 
allows new business models to develop while protecting consumers and ensuring fair 
taxation and employment conditions.  
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3.5.2 With Legal Battles 
(1)  France [Partial ban as illegal] 
1. France government initially started to suppress the service with their policy and later 
started allowing Uber services in certain cases, not all the services. 
2. UberX is the low cost service that allows only the licensed drivers to operate the cabs and 
UberPop is also a service but allows even the drivers without a driving license to operate 
the cab. 
3. The government allowed the former but not the latter stating that it would severely affect 
the regular taxi drivers. 
4. Uber did not accept the decision and filed against the government which led to huge 
violent protests by taxi drivers. Finally, Uber has suspended their UberPop services until 
hearing the final judicial result. 
5. Uber announced that it would re-launch its UberPop services if the government considers 
Uber to be legal. But that seems to be highly unlikely. 
6. Currently, UberPop is banned from functioning in France. Uber was facing equal protests 
from traditional Taxi drivers stating that it is not a fair competition as the taxi drivers are 
exempted from the taxes paid by them. 
(2)  Thailand  [Full ban] 
1. Following concerns raised by taxi drivers in Thailand over the lower rates charged by 
Uber drivers, the head of the country's Department of Land Transport (DLT) declared 
Uber illegal on November 28, 2014 alleging that Uber vehicles are not properly registered 
in Thailand, the charging methods of Uber drivers are not valid, Thai Uber drivers are not 
properly licensed, and the service discriminates against people who do not possess credit 
cards. 
2. The Department also raised security concerns over Uber's credit card-only policy in 
Thailand, and the head of DLT said that Uber was also illegal under Thailand's Motor 
Vehicle Act B.E. 2522. 
3. Following the announcement of the November 2014, Uber drivers faced a maximum 
4,000-baht fine if caught by police. 
4. Meanwhile, a meeting of different government agencies was held to decide how Uber 
services would be managed in the future.   
(3) Brazil [Against law and prohibited except in certain cities] 
1. Uber has been used in Brazil since 2015, but only in four major cities: São Paulo, Rio de 
Janeiro, Belo Horizonte and Brasília. Since it is a user-friendly app and broke up the 
monopoly of cab drivers on individual transport, Uber use has increased a lot over the first 
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half of 2015. Uber is the preference for passengers who appreciate safety, more diversity 
in payment options (due to credit cards) and promotional offers. 
2. Since cab drivers are very organized in Brazil, they have frequently been protesting against 
Uber. They complain that since they pay taxes, Uber drivers or owners should too. 
3. In some cases, cab drivers have been violent. In Belo Horizonte, they've persecuted Uber 
drivers. In Rio de Janeiro, threats are common, and there was a massive protest against 
Uber there in late July 2015. In Brazil, a man was attacked by mistake in the airport of 
Brazil's capital after cab drivers had thought he was an Uber user. 
4. Due to the organization of cab drivers, their lobbying power is huge and in most cities 
where Uber is used, politicians are working for its prohibition. 
5. In Sao Paulo and Brazil, local legislators have approved different projects to forbid Uber. 
The mayor of São Paulo has to decide if this prohibition will become law. The governor of 
Brazil voted the ban on Uber, although this doesn't technically legalize the service. In Rio 
de Janeiro and Belo Horizonte, Uber is still operating without legal constraints. But their 
municipal chambers are expected to be as strict as in the other cities.  
(4) Belgium [Partial ban as illegal] 
1. As in many other cities, established taxi drivers protested against UberPOP (which relies 
on non- professional drivers using their vehicles) since its arrival in Brussels in 2014. 
2. With such protest, a Belgian court ordered Uber to stop the UberPOP service in 
September 2015. 
3. In response to the court order, Uber decided to suspend its unlicensed UberPOP service in 
Brussels and concentrate on building up its more expensive UberX service, which uses 
professionally licensed drivers. 
4. While Uber has more than 50,000 users in Brussels, they are obliged to use only UberX, a 
service launched in September 2015. 
5. Therefore, while some 1,000 Brussels drivers had used their cars to chauffeur passengers 
through UberPOP, drivers on the UberX service are very limited. 
(5)  Netherland [Partial ban as illegal] 
1. UberPop service was launched as a pilot project in Amsterdam between July and 
September 2014 followed by an expansion project in Hague and Rotterdam. 
2. Currently, the Uber offer its UberX, UberBlack, UberVan and newly launched UberBike 
service. The UberBike is exclusively targeted at cyclists; now they can order a taxi 
equipped with a bicycle rack that can fit one city bike or two racing bikes. 
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3. In December 2015 a court in Netherlands had banned the company’s low cost service 
UberPop because of its violations of the law on licensing of drivers. The Transport 
inspectors carried out campaigns against the service and fined Uber a total of 450,000 
euros for breaking taxi regulations with its UberPop service. 
4. In November 2015, Uber withdrew its controversial UberPop service in Netherlands by 
following the order of Trade and Industry Appeals Tribunal in Hague and said the 
UberPop is a hindrance to the constructive dialogue about modernizing the existing taxi 
rules. 
5. As Uber runs all of its European operations from Netherlands, so the company often 
faced criticism and accusations of processing revenues through its Dutch subsidiaries, 
because of the lower tax rate. 
(6) Germany [Partial ban as illegal] 
1. The taxi industry is archaic in Germany. Large taxi companies were driven by the profit 
motivation in a quasi-monopolistic market. 
2. They have little reason to invest to improve customer service. Instead of upgrading their 
system by challenging innovation, they have chosen to continue using an inefficient and 
outdated system. 
3. March 2015, the Frankfurt district court imposed a nationwide ban on local transport 
services using UberPop because its drivers didn't have licenses for transport. 
4. So Uber had to stop its UberPop service. It resumed service under the name UberX  with 
guarantees that its cars and drivers would comply with specific legal requirements. But 
taxi drivers remain skeptical. The taxi driver trade union declared it would watch whether 
Uber is abiding by local regulations. 
5. Though UberPop was banned, it introduced another service Uber Black (luxury version of 
UberX). It is not completely prohibited but still legal proceedings are ongoing stating that 
they are hired cars different from taxi drivers. 
6. Security and insurance issues remain as the drivers need not necessarily own their license. 
7. Finally, another new service ‘UberTaxi’ was introduced that adhere to the local and legal 
requirements of the government. 
8. Uber has criticized the German courts for trying to force the digital platform to comply 
with laws "dating back to the '50s." Uber brought its concerns about the restrictions to the 
European Commission. 
9. Consequently, Uber’s ride-sharing revolution resulted in disengagement from German 
institutional systems. 
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(7) Italy [Partial ban as illegal] 
1. Traditional taxi drivers in Italy raised a protest against UberPop, which was yet another 
legal battle thrust upon Uber.  
2. The court forbade UberPop for allowing unlicensed drivers for the taxi services. UberPop 
allows ride sharing services, and it also allows any person to use their car as a taxi which 
increases the risk to customers. 
3. UberPop is just a variation version of Uber, which is being offered in the country regions 
where the operation of unlicensed taxis is prohibited. 
4. Uber was given a time frame of 15 days to comply with the rules or encounter a fine of 
20,000 euros for each day’s delay in court meeting. 
5. On May 26, 2015, the court ordered a complete ban on the UberPop services much to the 
shock of the organization. 
(8)  Finland [Suspicious it is illegal but connive to operate] 
1. Taxies in Finland are fairly expensive (A typical 10 km ride costs 1.2-1.6 times higher 
than NYC). 
2. Uber started its operations in Helsinki, Finland in 2014 and offered two products, Uber 
Black and UberPop on a six month trail. The app has been controversial from the 
beginning because of its direct hit on the operating model of existing taxi industry, which 
is highly regulated from pricing to the number of licensed taxis. 
3. The Finnish Taxi Association requested the police authorities to step in and deal with 
unauthorized and controversial taxi traffic by ride sharing service in the same manner as in 
other countries.  
4. The Finnish Tax Administration says it is concerned that some drivers working for Uber 
may be avoiding paying taxes. 
5. The Tax Administration stressed that it is not authorized to determine whether Uber’s 
services conform to Finnish law, which requires taxi service providers to obtain a specific 
authorization for their business. 
6. Uber clarified itself as not a taxi company. But it’s illegal to operate a cab without a 
license. The Finnish police instructed citizens not to use illicit taxis and call the police 
emergency service if they spot any such taxi. The police are using surveillance, citizen 
reports, and even sting operations to crack down on the drivers. The police weekend long 
road side checkpoints intended to catch drunk drivers also caught several illicit taxis, many 
of whom were working for Uber.  
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7. The Helsinki Court has found a 23 year old man guilty of illegally operating as a taxi 
driver with Uber’s ride-sharing service in Helsinki for three and half months. The man 
received a 25 day fine amounting to 150 euros and was ordered to surrender his ill-gotten 
gains estimated at 12,000 euros to the state. 
8. Recently, The Ministry of Transport and Communications has proposed new legislation to 
reform the transport in Finland and among other things propose the small freight and 
passenger transport permitted without a license up to an annual turnover of 10,000 euros.  
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3.6 Uber Adaption in Countries/Cities depending on Growth Rate and Institutional Elasticity 
(1) Scheme of Adaption to Institutional Systems 
By the preceding analyses, it can be postulated that the contrast of Uber’s global expansion 
without and with legal battles can be attributed to its co-evolution or disengagement with the 
host institutions. Furthermore, this contrast can be subject to the velocity of Uber “invasion” 
(its growth rate) and institutional elasticity of the host. While rapid growth enhances 
functionality development level significantly, it allows insufficient time for the host to 
routinization resulting in it being unable to accomplish its self-propagation as demonstrated 
in Table 3. Non-elastic institutions apt to internal regulations protect vested interests of 
incumbent organizations as demonstrated in Fig. 8. 
 
     With an understanding that there exists a certain threshold resisting innovation (Oreg et  
al., 2015 [16]), Fig. 9 illustrates a scheme of adaption of Uber in institutional systems. 
Critical legal battles in Germany and France, for example, can be attributed to rapid growth 
in their non-elastic institutions, while the relatively mild state in Finland notwithstanding its 
non-elastic institutions can be attributed to Uber’s steady growth. Active operation in 
Singapore and Saudi Arabia notwithstanding legality can be attributed to a co-evolution with 
their elastic institutions which induces Uber’s rapid growth in these countries. Tokyo’s steady 
operation notwithstanding possible illegality can be attributed to its institutional elasticity 
with demanding nature in matured competitive environment and Uber’s steady growth.  
 
Noteworthy is those countries/cities without legal battles have constructed co-evolutionary 
acclimatization system and harnessing the vigor of counterparts as a possible countermeasure 
to the trap in ICT advancement as reviewed in 3.2 (see Fig.6). This system induces CCSD 
(Consolidated Challenge to Social Demand) that consolidates broader stakeholders including 
company, employer, user and government for social demands like traffic, employment, 
environment, aging and disabled issues. 
 
Fig. 9. Scheme of Adaption of Uber in Institutional Systems. 
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 (2) Consequence of Uber-driven IDBM with and without CCSD 
The contrast between countries/cities with and without legal battles can be attributed to 
with or without CCSD as demonstrated in Fig. 10. While the former develops co-
evolutionary dynamism, the latter results in disengagement. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 10. Co-evolution and Disengagement between Uber-driven IDBM and Institutional 
Systems. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Countries without legal battle  Countries with legal battle  
Uber induced CCSD leading to a co-evolution 
between ride-sharing revolution and advancement of 
the institutional systems.  
Singapore: Induced incorporating user’s 
requirements into the tripartism framework 
(company, employee, government) by stimulating 
social demand (transport, job, productivity). 
Saudi Arabia: Enabled women’s social participation 
by providing the reliable transportation leading to  
co-evolution. 
Tokyo: Stimulated better service seeking competitive 
market broader stakeholder’s involvement for social 
demand solution. 
Traditional quasi-monopolistic market protected by 
non-innovative government impeded Uber’s 
revolution resulting in disengagement from the 
institutional systems. 
Germany: Government non-innovative policy 
urging traditional legal requirements in response to 
traditional taxi companies’ requirement to preserve 
existing profit securing system based on quasi-
monopolistic market impeded Uber’s disruptive 
innovation resulting in failing CCSD construction. 
 
France, Italy follows the similar results. 
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(3)  ICT-driven Disruptive Business Model with Consolidated Challenge to Social 
Demand 
Preceding analysis suggests that ICT-driven disruptive business models with a 
consolidated challenge to social demand (IDBM – CCSD) as illustrated in Fig. 11 would be 
decisive for resilient IDBM co-evolving with the institutional systems of the host (cities 
which introduce Uber: Uber introducing cities UIC). 
Uber is encouraging vertical and horizontal integration in the car-hire sector thereby it is 
reducing vertical fragmentation within taxi companies on company, employers and drivers 
relationship. Also, it is integrating the sector horizontally. Uber is compiling a massive 
database of driver and rider behavior essential to price-setting and market-making functions 
thereby reducing horizontal fragmentation of the sector (Rogers, 2015 [18]) Thus, Uber can 
be recognized as incorporating the inherent potential of IDBM with CCSD.  
   Given such inherent potential, Uber’s success in its global expansion depends on the 
optimization of timing, pace, and selection of the hosts with different social demands suitable 
enough to constructing co-evolutionary acclimatization.  
 
 
Fig. 11.  Scheme for ICT-Driven Disruptive Business Model with Consolidated 
Challenge to Social Demand (IDBM – CCSD). 
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4. Lessons from Success Model 
4.1  Significance of Shift to IDBM with CCSD 
Nowadays, a key factor in obtaining business opportunity is the ability to solve social 
demand. A company to gain a profit must consolidate all stakeholders: company, employee, 
user, and government with respective heterogeneous objectives. Developing systems that 
address all stakeholders’ demands in society as a whole can allow these disparate groups to 
successfully function together. In this process, the company can attain its profit seeking 
target as illustrated in Fig. 12. 
 
The company that can attain such system success has the following required abilities: 
(i)   Penetration of the social demand that can be its business opportunity, 
(ii)   Organize and orchestrate all stakeholders, and 
(iii) Attain the system success thereby gain profit. 
Effective development and utilization of ICT enable such endeavors which up to now had 
no conception. This is the reason why Uber, the crown jewel of ICT can be recognized as 
incorporating inherent potential of IDBM with CCSD. 
 
Fig. 12. Consolidated Challenge to Social Demand. 
4.2 IDBM with CCDS in Success Model   
Table 5 summarizes the structure of CCSD in success countries like Singapore, Saudi 
Arabia, and Tokyo. Singapore’s success can largely be attributed to its tripartism framework 
consisting of Ministry of Manpower, National Trades Union Congress, and Singapore 
National Employers Federation, and based on trust among them. Uber enabled user’s 
involvement in this framework thereby establishing the consolidation of all stakeholders as a 
company, employee, users and the government. Uber enjoys Singapore’s well developed 
(environmentallyfriendly), 
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infrastructure and innovation seeking spirit. Thus, co-evolutionary acclimatization based on 
IDBM with CCSD has been established. Success in Saudi Arabia owed largely to Uber’s 
contribution to women’s social participation which inevitably consolidates broad 
stakeholders involved in education and industrial structure. Country’s affluent financial base 
accelerates IDBM with CCSD. In Tokyo’s case, while legal constraints are strong, nation’s 
demanding nature and high potential demand with four times bigger market than NYC as 
well as matured competitive environment benefitted Uber to advance its business. Increasing 
demand in the aging society also accelerated unique IDBM with CCSD. 
 
Table 5 Structure in CCSD in Success Countries/Cities 
 Consolidated challenge 
by all stakeholders 
Social demand Co-evolutionary 
acclimatization 
Singapore Tripartism framework 
 User involvement 
   Company, employee,      
     user, government   
       consolidation 
Traffic service, Job 
opportunity, Overall 
productivity enhance, 
Digital innovation 
Tripartism framework, 
Well developed    
infrastructure, 
Innovation seeking   
spirit 
Saudi 
Arabia 
Women (user, employee) 
 Company involvement 
   Government involvement 
Women’s social 
participation, 
Education, Industrial 
structure 
Strong inertia to   
women’s social   
participation, 
Affluent financial base 
Tokyo User welcome 
  Company, employee   
   concern 
     Government   
      involvement 
Traffic service, ICT 
advancement,  
e-commerce, 
Depopulation,  
Aging society  
High potential demand, 
Demanding nature, 
Matured competitive 
environment 
 
4.3 Transformative Role of Co-evolutionary Acclimatization 
All success cases suggest the significance of CCSD through co-evolutionary 
acclimatization that creates IDBM with CCSD by harnessing the vigor of counterparts. The 
function of trust-based tripartism framework suggests the significance of ICT and trust 
toward IDBM with CCSD in the digitally-rich environment. 
Koopman et al. (2014 [12]) suggested that markets, competition, reputation systems, and 
ongoing innovation often solve problems better than regulation when we give them a chance 
to do so. Arvind et al. (2014 [1]) suggested that platforms can be better than governments at 
spotting stalkers, running background checks on sharing service providers, and responding 
quickly to conflicts among members as platforms are closer to the action and they have an 
incentive to look after their communities. They also pointed out that the task is to share the 
pain and the wealth, and if this sharing happens, the wealth will grow and endure.  
Cohen et al. (2014 [6]), by using agency theory, attempted to unveil the optimal 
relationship between service providers (agents) and the local governments (principals) to 
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achieve the common objective of sustainable mobility. They claimed that the private 
rideshare operators had opted to avoid interaction with local governments resulted in legal 
action and other threats posed by local governments and taxi operators. They suggested that 
shared mobility service providers would be better served by finding ways to collaborate with 
local governments. 
Posen (2015) [17] pointed out that the solution is not to force Uber to comply with 
outdated regulations; rather, regulators should rely on experimental regulations for safety, 
which will allow consumers to make their choice of which service they would like to use 
while ensuring their safety. Furthermore, by relying on the use of experimental regulations, 
regulators will be able to evaluate the effectiveness of the regulations as more information on 
these services becomes available. Experimental regulations of that nature will allow 
regulators to protect consumers and will allow consumers to have access to the services they 
want. Cusumano (2015) [8] suggested that traditional enterprises should be able to provide 
more reliable, consistent, broader, and safer services than sharing-economy competitors. 
    All suggest the significance of the transformative role that co-evolutionary acclimatization 
plays.  
 
Given that the key of Uber’s system success can largely be attributed to the emergence of 
un-captured GDP driven by the discrepancy between taxi prices and magnitude of their 
decline effect derived from Uber5 (Watanabe et al., 2016 [28]), how to transform this asset to 
hosts could be the fundamental question. We should note that co-evolutionary acclimatization 
dynamism incorporates this function as reviewed in Fig. 6. 
A vicious cycle which ICT advanced economies suffer is in compensation for un-captured 
GDP emergence as illustrated in the center of Fig. 6. This un-captured GDP satisfies 
people’s preferences shift to supra-functionality beyond economic value and plays a 
locomotive role for inducing further ICT advancement as illustrated in the right center of 
Fig. 6. While the further advancement of ICT accelerates to emerge un-captured GDP in ICT 
advanced economies, it is necessitated for sustainable GDP increase in ICT growing 
economies. However, they are running short of sufficient ability for this advancement. 
Therefore, upon appropriately transferred to ICT growing economies, transferred ICT may 
sufficiently contribute to increasing captured GDP in ICT growing economies which can be 
harnessed by ICT advanced economies for their balancing of captured and un-captured GDP 
as illustrated in the bottom of Fig. 6. 
This illustration suggests that co-evolutionary acclimatization dynamism incorporates 
self-organizing ability in attaining optimal timing, pace, and selection of the host. Also, we 
should not overlook the transformative role that this system functions in transforming un-
captured GDP (in ICT advanced economies) into captured GDP (in ICT growing economies) 
                                                          
5
 The substance of this un-captured GDP can be summed up as follows (Watanabe et al., 2016 [28]): 
High-qualified services with lower cost and shoter time. An increasing initiative of passengers and the 
company’s systematic market strategy of continuous deduction of costs and time in seasrch and matching, 
eliminating information asymmetries and compiling a massive database. 
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thereby enabling ICT advanced economies to maintain an optimal balance between captured 
and un-captured GDP as illustrated in Fig. 13. 
Thus, we could conclude that triggering to activate latent self-organization ability that co-
evolutionary acclimatization dynamism incorporates may provide the solution to Uber for its 
successful global expansion. This solution provides insightful suggestions for the trajectory 
management of the nations moving toward the era of IoT. 
 
 
Accelerate ICT advancement 
 
Emerge un-captured GDP  
 
Satisfy people’s preferences shift to supra-functionality 
beyond economic value while maintaining economic value 
 
Induce further ICT advancement 
 
Increase un-captured GDP               Transfere to IGE 
 
                                              Increase captured GDP 
 
                                               Harness the vigor of IGE 
 
Fig. 13.  Scheme of Optimal Dynamism for Balancing Captured and Un-captured GDP. 
  
 
 
IGE: ICT  
growing 
economies 
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5. Conclusion 
In light of a question raised regarding the rationale of noting ICT-driven disruptive 
business model (IDBM) demonstrated by Uber the crown jewel of ICT, and given Uber’s 
legal battles in a number of cities around the world  as it rapidly expanded globally to over 
479 cities worldwide, the institutional sources contrasting such success and failure were 
examined. 
Aiming at elucidating these sources, focusing on the ICT’s inherent function on which 
IDBM is based, comparative empirical analysis of Uber’s global expansion was attempted. 
Noteworthy findings include: 
(i) Success or failure of Uber’s global expansion can be attributed to its co-evolution or 
disengagement with host institutions, 
 
(ii) This contrast can be subject to Uber’s growth rate and institutional elasticity of the 
host, 
 
(iii) Countries/cities without battles have constructed co-evolutionary acclimatization 
system and harnessed the vigor of counterparts, 
 
(iv) This system induces CCSD (Consolidated Challenge to Social Demand) that 
consolidate the broad stakeholders including company, employer, user and 
government, based on trust among them, for social demands, 
 
(v) Thus, IDBM with CCSD would be critical for resilient IDBM co-evolving with the 
institutional systems of the host, 
 
(vi) Since Uber can be recognized as incorporating the inherent potential of IDBM with 
CCSD, its success in global expansion depends on the optimal balance of timing, 
pace, and selection of the host suitable enough to constructing a co-evolutionary 
acclimatization, 
 
(vii) Transformative role incorporated in co-evolutionary acclimatization dynamism, upon 
functioning, may lead to this optimization, and 
 
(viii) Therefore, triggering  the activation of latent self-organization resources ability that 
co-evolutionary acclimatization incorporates may provide the solution to Uber for its 
successful global expansion. 
These findings form the bases for the following suggestions supportive to sound 
development of worldwide IDBM:  
(i) Careful and thorough consideration of IDBM development with CCSD, 
 
(ii) The “quadpartism” framework enabling careful consultation among company, 
employee, user, and government, 
 
(iii) Optimal balance between captured and un-captured GDP emergence, 
 
(iv) Effective triggers activating the latent ability of self-organization incorporated in the 
co-evolutionary acclimatization system, and 
 
(v) Instilling of the leading role of IDBM in solving social demands.  
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This analysis has explored a prototype of the analysis of IDBM for sound global expansion 
focusing on ICT inherent functions. A similar approach is expected to be undertaken for 
similar IDBM such as education, digital music, electric game, and printing/publishing. 
 
Given the significance of ICT and trust toward IDBM with CCSD in the digitally-rich 
environment, trust-based education toward digitally-rich learning environments would be 
particularly expected as a  timely subject to undertake. 
 
By doing the analysis of Uber, authors succeeded to project national level findings on un-
captured GDP onto the business level. Further projection onto the user level should be 
explored. An empirical analysis of digital music may open an insightful path for this 
development. 
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Appendix 1 Self-propagating Nature of ICT Leveraging Spin-off 
Diffusion trajectory of innovative goods Y      Simple Logistic Growth (SLG) with fixed carrying capacity (N) 
 
 
                                                                                              
 
 
Carrying capacity increases as Y increases.                       Functionality spirally increases as Y increases. 
 
 
                     Self-propagation                                                        Spin-off 
 
 
Appendix 2  Scheme of the Bi-polarization Fatality of Logistic Growth. 
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Appendix 3 ICT-driven Logistic Growth and Its Bi-polarization  
                                                   (A Case of 100 Countries in 2011). 
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Highlights  
 
Institutional sources contrasting the success and failure of Uber’s expansion was identified.  
 
Bi-polarization nature inherent to ICT growth was identified as a source of the contrast. 
 
ICT-driven disruptive business model with consolidated challenge for social demands was 
recommended. 
 
Co-evolutionary acclimatization dynamism was identified as enabling such a business model. 
 
Activation of this dynamism was encouraged as a way to provide the solution for Uber’s 
expansion. 
